Op-Ed

I have an op-ed in the New York Sun, on revelations from the LBJ tapes and Israel's role in the current presidential election.

Take Home

Basic requirements: Pen an elegant, yet concise, 7-8 page typewritten response to one of the exciting questions from each section below. Answers should: (a) present a compelling argument; (b) use at least three or four specific historical examples; and (c) cite material from the readings and/or the presentations, as relevant.

Due, via email to me, by 15 June. If you need more time, just let me know.

Section One. Choose one of two:

1.) In a recent interview with Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, Barack Obama asserted that the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict “infect[s] all of our foreign policy” in the region. Leaving aside the word choice, to what extent do you agree with Obama’s analysis? Can and should historians view U.S. relations with the Middle East since 1967 as dominated by the effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

2.) How much did the Cold War affect the U.S. approach to the Middle East? Discuss by comparing U.S. policy toward the region during either the first twenty (1947-1967) or the last twenty (1967-1987) years of the Cold War with U.S. policy toward the region since the end of the Cold War (since 1989, in other words).

Section Two. Choose one of two:

1.) Revisionist scholars speak frequently of the legacy of “Western imperialism” affecting the Middle East. To what extent should the United States be viewed as a “Western” power—i.e., to what extent have U.S. interests and policies toward the region since 1800 coincided with those of Britain, France, or other European powers? Be sure to include material from both before and after 1930 in your response.

2.) Frank Ninkovich, one of the country’s leading diplomatic historians, has described the 20^th century as the “Wilsonian Century.” To what extent is his approach correct? Define Wilsonian ideals as they applied to the Middle East, and then analyze the issue by discussing U.S. policy toward the region in the 20^th century. Be sure to include material from both before and after World War II in your response.

The Besieged LBJ and Israel

On May 1, the LBJ Library released the recordings from the first four months of 1968--which include items on Tet and the President's decision not to run for re-election. One of the newly released items features Johnson chatting with UN ambassador Arthur Goldberg, one week before LBJ announced his withdrawal from the 1968 election. The ostensible subject matter was a UN resolution condemning Israel, after a retaliatory raid against a Palestinian terrorist attack from Jordan. But LBJ then suggests his growing political isolation has made him more sympathetic to Israel, and reaffirms his support for Israel in rather earthy terms.



ARTHUR GOLDBERG: Of course, the poor King [Hussein] is in a hell of a box. His throat is in the . . . is there all the time.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Yeah, I feel sorry—

GOLDBERG: There isn’t a hell of a lot more that he can do than what he’s been doing.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I feel sorry for him. Although I thought he sent us kind of a mean wire—

GOLDBERG: Yes—

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: It was unnecessary.

GOLDBERG: Yes. Yes. I feel sorry for him.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I lost—I felt sorry for him, but I lost a little of my sympathy with his reply to my wire the other night, asking him to . . .

GOLDBERG: Yeah. Yes. Well, you know, they—

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You saw my wire and his reply, didn’t you?

GOLDBERG: No, I did not see that.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Well, when they [the State Department] sent the wire, they told Israel that this was disastrous.

GOLDBERG: Uh-huh.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: It was pretty strong. I cut out a word or two of their mean wire to ‘em. I said, “Are we wiring Jordan to watch them to watch these terrorist activities?” They said no. I said, “Well, why not?” Well, they didn’t—this and that. I said, “Let’s just send them both a wire? If you’re going to wire one of them, let’s send them both a wire.”

So they sent them a wire. Eshkol came back with two pages, and said they’re bombing his kids, and they were doing all these other things, and everything’s provocative. He didn’t—he didn’t justify what he’d done, but he at least explained what motivated him.

GOLDBERG: Yeah.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: And was pretty reasoning to me.

And the goddamn King wired me back and said, “Go to hell.”

GOLDBERG: Really?

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Yeah.

GOLDBERG: Well, you know the Arabs are impossible down here. I have to have the patience of a saint to deal with them. They always keep referring to our domestic events.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: [softly] Mm.

GOLDBERG: And I have to slap ‘em down. They’re . . . a terribly emotional bunch.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: You’re the only man I know that’s got as mean a type of assignment as I have. And I don’t know how you do it as well as you do. I just honestly don’t.

But . . . I sure as hell want to be careful, and not run out on little Israel.

GOLDBERG: Yeah.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: If they—because they haven’t got many friends in the world.

GOLDBERG: I know they haven’t.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: They’re in about the same shape I am. And the closer I got—I face adversity, the closer I get to them.

GOLDBERG: Yeah.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Because I got a bunch of Arabs after me—about a hundred million of ‘em, and there’s just two million of us. [Chuckles; Goldberg joins in.] So I can understand them a little bit.

GOLDBERG: I—

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: And I don’t want—there’s nobody fussing at me, nobody raising hell with me. Nobody, not one human’s called me about it.

I just . . . my State Department, sometimes—I just want to be damn sure that I don’t wind up here getting in the shape Eisenhower did, where I want to put sanctions on ‘em—

GOLDBERG: Well, we’re never going to put sanctions on—

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: The only people they got in the world, that they got faith in, I think, [i]s me and you. I was down there at the ranch, and I looked at ‘em, and I . . .

They don’t know when they’re going to be run over; they don’t know when they’re going to die; they don’t know when those goddamn Russians are going to come in there. They don’t know anything.

And the only thing they got is a little hope, and a prayer, and a wing . . . for me, if my heart keeps beating. And I don’t want ‘em to look back and say, “Well, he got to limber tail, and he ran,” and so forth.

Now, I’ve been hard and tough with them. I haven’t given them their Phantoms.

GOLDBERG: Yeah.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I haven’t done this or that. But I just—I’m damn sure going to give them to ‘em, because I want the Russians to quit arming, and agree to file up there [at the UN] with you-all what they do arm, and they cut back on their ABM.

And if they’re not going to do any of it, and they’re going to continue to pour arms in there, I want to make them take the consequences of their actions—and I’m going to stick it up of Israel’s bottom just as much as I’ve got.

GOLDBERG: Amen to that.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: Well, that’s what I’m going to do.

GOLDBERG: Yeah, well—

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I didn’t tell them [the Israelis] that. I just told them I wasn’t going to—

GOLDBERG: No, no—

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I wasn’t going to be responsible. But that’s what I’m going to do!

GOLDBERG: Right.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I said, “You don’t need to worry if they [the Soviets] keep arming them [the Arabs]. I’m not going to let you just stay there and let you get eaten up, like the little boy that the calf was playing with. And his daddy walked out and saw him, and caught him. And he said, ‘Bobby, you just going to stay there, and let the calf eat me up?’” [The President chuckles.]

GOLDBERG: Mm-hmm. Well, there you’re absolutely, a thousand percent right.

Conference Program

Sunday, 25.5

14:00-14:30 Welcoming and Opening Remarks

Mordechai Tamarkin, Head, The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research

Zvi Shtauber, Director, The Institute for National Security Studies

Dany Leviatan, Rector, Tel Aviv University

14:30-16:00 Session I

Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives

Chairperson - David Vital (Tel Aviv University)

Janice Gross Stein (University of Toronto)

From a Bipolar World to a Unipolar One: International Efforts to Resolve Local Conflicts

Rajan Menon (Lehigh University)

'The Responsibility to Protect': An Idea Worth Considering for Managing Local Conflict?

Yossi Beilin (Knesset Member)

The Interface between Academia and Practice in the Context of Conflict Resolution

16:00-16:30 Coffee break

16:30-18:00 Session II

The Cold War and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Chairperson – Gabriel Gorodetsky (Tel Aviv University)

Galia Golan (The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya)

The Soviet Union and the Efforts to Resolve the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Avraham Ben-Zvi (The University of Haifa)

Between Comprehensiveness and Step-by-Step: Rogers, Kissinger, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Kenneth W. Stein (Emory University)

The Carter Administration: From a Comprehensive Peace to a Separate One

Monday, 26.5

09:30-11:00 Session III

From the Cold War to a New World Order: The Middle East, 1980-2007

Chairperson – Arnon Gutfeld (Tel Aviv University)

Robert David (KC) Johnson (Brooklyn College)

The Reagan-Bush Administrations and the Middle East

Shibley Telhami (University of Maryland)

The Clinton Administration and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Robert Lieber (Georgetown University)

The George W. Bush Administration and the Middle East

11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:30 Session IV

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the Web of Regional and International Politics:

Local Perspectives

Chairperson – Shimon Shamir (Tel Aviv University)

Samir Hulileh (Portland Trust)

In Search for Peace and Justice: A Palestinian Perspective Towards the Role of the International Community

Yehuda Ben Meir (The Institute for National Security Studies)

Israeli Perspective

Shlomo Brom (The Institute for National Security Studies)

Managing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Local Actors' Response to International Policing

Yossi Kostiner (Tel Aviv University)

Mediation by Local Powers: Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process

13:00-15:00 Lunch break

15:00-16:30 Session V

Europe and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in the Aftermath of the Cold War

Chairperson – Uzi Eilam (The Institute for National Security Studies)

Ron Pundak (Peres Center for Peace)

Norway and the Oslo Agreement

Jean-Pierre Filiu (Sciences Po, Paris)

Reflections on French Experiences in the Middle East

Georg Simonis (Fern Universität, Hagen)

The EU and its Efforts to Resolve the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

16:30-17:00 Coffee break

17:00-19:00 Session VI

Diplomatic Round-Table

Chairperson - Zvi Shtauber (former Israeli Ambassador in London)

Itamar Rabinovich (former Israeli Ambassador in Washington)

Saeb Erakat (chief Palestinian negotiator)

Daniel C. Kurtzer (former US Ambassador in Cairo and Tel Aviv)

Tuesday, 27.5

09:30-11:00 Session VII

Conflict-Resolution Efforts in Post-Cold War Europe

Chairperson - Rafi Vago (Tel Aviv University)

James Gow (King's College, London)

International Engagement and the Yugoslav War of Dissolution

Dimitri Trenin (Carnegie Foundation, Moscow)

Conflicts in Russia's Neighbourhood: From Situation-Freezing to Dispute-Resolution

Adrian Guelke (Queen's University of Belfast)

External Mediation and Internal Ownership – The Belfast and St. Andrews Agreements Compared

11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:30 Session VIII

Peace-Keeping Operations

Chairperson – Kobi Michael (The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies)

Efrat Elron (Hebrew University, Jerusalem)

The Evolution of Peace Operations: From the Cold War to the Global Era

Stefan Wolff (University of Nottingham)

European Union Crisis Management in the Western Balkans: Policy Objectives, Capabilities and Effectiveness

Chen Kertcher (Tel Aviv University)

Same Agenda, Different Results: the UN peacekeeping in Cambodia and Somalia

Udi Dekel (Former C.O. Liaison Unit & Head of Strategic Division)

The Effectiveness of Peace-Keeping Forces: The Israeli Experience

13:00-15:00 Lunch break

15:00-16:30 Session IX

Military Intervention and Democratization: Global Order and the Radical Islamist Challenge

Chairperson - Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (The Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University)

Marvin G. Weinbaum (Middle East Institute, Washington. D.C.)

Lost Faith, Forfeited Trust: Afghan Responses to Post-9/11 International Intervention

in State-Building and Insurgency

Michael Eisenstadt (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy)

Military Intervention, Political Violence and Transitional Democratic Politics in Iraq

Eyal Zisser (The Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University)

Military Intervention and Democratization: Global Order and the Radical Islamic Challenge in Lebanon

16:30-17:00 Coffee break

17:00-18:30 Concluding Session

Chairperson - Eyal Zisser, Director, The Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University

Daniel C. Kurtzer (Princeton University)

Rajan Menon (Lehigh University)

LBJ & Israel Tapes

McGeorge Bundy--Track One


Abe Feinberg--Track Two

Dean Rusk--Track Three



Abraham Ribicoff--Track Four



Arthur Goldberg--Track Five



Dean Rusk--Track Six



Walt Rostow--Track Seven



Bill Fulbright--Track Eight



Dwight Eisenhower--Track Nine



Dwight Eisenhower--Track Ten



Everett Dirksen--Track Eleven



Bill Fulbright--Track 12



Russell Long--Track 13



Arthur Goldberg--Track 14



Everett Dirksen--Track 15



Arthur Goldberg--Track 16



Gale McGee--Track 17

May 5 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Beyond 2002

May 5, 2008

I. Road to 9/11

1. 2000 (Clinton foreign and domestic struggles; administration divisions; election)

2. Early Bush (Powell/Rice/Rumsfeld; role of Tenet & Mineta; bureaucratic divisions; Cheney?)

3. After 9/11 (9/11 and Saddam; U.S. and Northern Alliance; revising Musharraf relationship; Karzai solution)

II. Path to War

1. Domestic Response to 9/11 (Guantánamo and constitutional theories; failure to capture bin Laden; Patriot Act and civil liberties; Yoo and unitary executive theory; Lieberman and Homeland Security Department; Rove and political issues—Chambliss/Cleland race)

2. Run-up (sanctions and international diplomacy; Clinton and Iraq Liberation Act; significant obstacles: Shinseki; Turks and Kurdistan; French/German hostility; role of Eastern Europe; Iranian question; Blix and lack of WMD)

3. Rationale (schisms between Old Bush and New Bush; rationales: Tenet, Powell, and WMDs; neocons and democracy; Rumsfeld as test case; Cheney and Chalabi, Office of Special Plans and undoing excesses of 1970s; Rice)

4. National Response (New York Times and flawed coverage; role of Pincus and Hersh; divisions among Democrats; significance of Powell)

III. War & Consequences

1. Conflict (“Coalition of the Willing”: significance of Turkish refusal, role of Eastern Europe; Iranian question; from WMD’s and Republican Guard to fedayeen—Franks’ difficulty in adjusting; embedding press and U.S. public opinion)

2. Aftermath of War (looting; lessons of Balkans vs. Bush hostility to Clinton policies & Rumsfeld drawn-down approach; Wolfowitz and lack of contingency planning; Tommy Franks; difficulties of fedayeen; did a chance of success exist?)

3. Difficulties of Nation-Building (Garner, Franks, and start of insurgency; Garner/Bremer dispute and De-Baathification; Bremer qualifications; Moqtadr al-Sadr, Abu Ghraib: who’s in charge?; gap between abstraction and policy outcomes)

4. War on the Home Front (anti-European sentiment; superficial regional knowledge; Rove and domestic politics: “mission accomplished” banner; Democratic divisions—Dean vs. Kerry; Plame leak and calls for special prosecutor; administration response; response of the press; Iraq and 2004 elections; failed search for WMD’s)

5. Beyond Iraq (Iran: from Axis of Evil speech to confrontation over nuclear weapons; Saudi Arabia: limits of friendship?; Israel: U.S. and the Lebanon war; road to Annapolis; Syria: congressional engagement—Pelosi, Specter—vs. administration stand-offishness; Turkey: containing the Kurds and Islamist movement; Egypt: foreign aid and leverage; Afghanistan: limits of U.S. leverage?; fringes of region—Pakistan, Somalia; cultural diplomacy: lessons of Al-Jazeera)

April 30 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Road to 9/11

April 30, 2008

I. Clinton and the Middle East

1. Inheriting Bush Difficulties (foreign policy and the 1992 campaign; ineffective early advisors; Somalia, Bosnia, 1994)

2. Terrorism (first WTC bombing: State/DOD, Reno, Clarke, road to Khobar Towers)

3. Taliban & Al Qaeda (US and Afghan civil war; Saudis, Pakistanis, and UNOCAL; second-term distractions: Starr, Kosovo, Pakistani issues)

II. 2000

1. Clinton’s Struggles (domestic context: Starr inquiry, movement toward impeachment, partisan polarization; international context: Kosovo conflict and constitutional showdown, Pakistani issues, terrorism)

2. Administration Divisions (Taliban as potential allies against bin Laden, or clear enemies [Richardson/State vs. Clarke]; assassination acceptable [DOD/Clarke/CIA vs. Justice Department]; Taliban as ideological or strategic enemies [Hillary vs. Clarke]; problem overstated? fizzling of Millennium threats, then USS Cole—Yemeni port scheme, futility of Clinton response, US as “paper tiger”?)

3. Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Oslo and U.S. disengagement; Rabin assassination and emergence of Netanyahu; Clinton, Netanyahu, and the Palestinians; Barak and re-engagement—legacy issue; U.S. and Syria; failure at Camp David; blame game)

4. Election (terrorism and campaign: Bush and Rice, strong hostility to “nation-building”; Republican right—1990s literature on missile shields, North Korea, evil states—looking backwards; neocon arguments on democracy; Gore—difficulties with Clinton, Reno and Elian Gonzalez affair, downplay foreign policy?)

III. 9/11 and Beyond

1. Early Bush (foreign policy team—weakness of Powell, role of Rice, Rumsfeld death watch?—former cheney aide—Career Pentagon officials "fear they're shackled to incompetence”—talk of libs saving Rumsfeld, retaining Tenet; Clarke and bureaucratic battles; warnings from the field—Arizona, Minnesota; weaknesses in airport security—airline industry, consumer groups, fear of federal power; PDB; path to attacks)

2. International Response (Bush/Rumsfeld, Clarke, and Saddam?; significance of Tenet; NATO and international support; U.S. and Northern Alliance; revising Musharraf relationship; decision for war; ousting the Taliban, bolstering Karzai; Guantánamo and constitutional theories; failure to capture bin Laden)

3. Domestic Response (Patriot Act and civil liberties; Yoo and unitary executive theory; Lieberman and Homeland Security Department; Rove and political issues—Chambliss/Cleland race)

April 28 Notes

Bill Clinton & Middle Eastern Affairs

April 28, 2008

I. The First Gulf War

1. The Middle East in the New World Order (Gorbachev and crumbling of Soviet bloc; Gorbachev foreign policy; Bush and world affairs; NSD 26)

2. Run-up to the War (1989-1990 congressional pressure; international significance: Saudis, Kuwaitis, British; Bush, Baker, and coalition: USSR, PRC, Arab states, UN)

3. War & Aftermath (constitutional debate; military strategy; collapse of Iraqi forces; postwar structure; missed opportunity?)

II. From Bush to Clinton

1. 1992 Campaign (domestic focus: budget deal, economic downturn, “Year of the Woman”: Thomas/Hill hearings, abortion; scandal and reform: House bank scandal, term-limits movement, Clinton scandal, Perot—withdrawal and re-entry; foreign policy and the decline of Afghanistan; Clinton victory)

2. Inheriting Bush Difficulties (foreign policy team—Christopher, Aspin, Lake: Carter retreads?; national security difficulties—CIA and Woolsey; DADT and military; Somalia—from humanitarian to mission creep, withdrawal; Bosnia and opening to Muslim world?: tensions with NATO allies, congressional pressure—McCloskey, Dole, road to Dayton; early team struggles—Hillary, Whitewater, path to Starr, 1994 elections)

III. The Clinton Agenda

1. Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Oslo and U.S. disengagement; Rabin assassination and emergence of Netanyahu; Clinton, Netanyahu, and the Palestinians; Barak and re-engagement—legacy issue; U.S. and Syria; failure at Camp David; blame game)

2. Terrorism (first WTC bombing: improper frameworks? State-sponsored terrorism—Libya, Iran; law enforcement—legacy of 1960s, COINTELPRO, Watergate and concerns with domestic spying, Gorelick memo; Clarke and Counter-Terrorism Committee (“think globally, act globally”)—calls for focus on “ad hoc terrorists”; Yousef arrest and uncovering of airport plots; diplomatic reluctance to challenge Saudi Arabia—Khobar Towers)

3. The Taliban (Afghan civil war—State, DOD, CIA disinterest; emergence of Mullah Omar; Saudi and Pakistani roles; oil UNOCAL and desire for stability)

4. Second-Term Struggles (domestic context: Starr inquiry, movement toward impeachment, partisan polarization; international context: Kosovo conflict and constitutional showdown, Pakistani issues—nuclear weapons, restoration of democracy; terrorism—East African attacks; administration divisions: Clinton desire to do something; Hillary and international feminism; State Department and “engagement”; DOD and Mullah Omar’s 53 stingers; Richardson and diplomatic opening; CIA and anti-Taliban covert op; Clarke and targeting of Bin Laden; Reno and opposition to assassination; problem overstated?: fizzling of Millennium threats, then USS Cole)

April 30: Lecture: Road to 9/11 May 5: Lecture: Afghanistan & Iraq

May 7: no class—college holiday May 12: Lecture: Looking Back

May 14: Presentation: Syria/Lebanon May 19: Presentation: S. Arabia & Gulf States

May 21: Presentation: Israel May 26: Presentation: Pakistan

May 28: no class (I have a talk at Western Galilee)

June 2: Presentation: Egypt & North Africa June 4: Presentation: Iran

April 9 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

The First President Bush

April 9, 2008

I. Reagan and Southwest Asia

1. The Iran-Iraq War (from CENTCOM to pro-Saddam tilt; the Tanker War and reflagging decision; US and Gulf States)

2. Casey & Wilson (Reagan and cult of covert operations; Wilson and ability to maneuver Congress)

3. Victory and Its Effects (CIA/Saudi/ISI alliance; significance of stingers; missed opportunities?)

II. The End of the Cold War and the Revival of Middle East Tensions

1. The Cold War Ends (Gorbachev and crumbling of Soviet bloc—perestroika, glasnost; Eastern bloc strategies of survival; economics, Solidarity, and Poland; Hungary and DDR; collapse of East Germany and reunification; importance of the Baltic States and emergence of Yeltsin; dissolution of USSR)

2. The Middle East in the New World Order (Gorbachev foreign policy; PRC and Tiananmen; Saddam after the Iraq war; Bush background—political difficulties, Panama invasion; Bush and Shamir; NSD 26; Bush and the Saudis; Khomeini’s death and Iran’s turn inward)

3. Afghanistan in the New World Order (media role; Wilson and continued push for aid; ISI and Kashmir; Najibullah and desire for national unity government—Bush, Wilson, Pakistan rejection; Bush I: bureaucratic divisions, global distractions; what could US have done differently?—question of leverage)

III. The Gulf War

1. Run-up to the Invasion (Iraq and NSD 26; Congress: Dole, Simpson, and aid, Metzenbaum and human rights, Gonzales, Kerry, and BNL; Justice Department; Kuwait dispute: diplomatic failure?, trusting Saudis; US intelligence failure?)

2. Run-up to the War (Bush, Thatcher, and decision to protest; significance of Saudis; Kuwaitis and U.S. public opinion; Bush and international coalition—role of Arab states; role of UN—significance of Shevardnadze, realism and the relationship with PRC, path to UN 678)

3. Domestic Matters (domestic difficulties: Bush, taxes, and 1988 campaign; deficit, interest rate, and economic slowdown; Darman and budget deal; emergence of Gingrich; Bush and Mitchell: congressional Democrats and post-Cold War world; 1990 elections; Bush and UN argument; congressional pressure; Senate debate; Baker-Aziz meeting)

4. War & Aftermath (decision for war and operation of coalition military strategies—air campaign, effect of Vietnam; diplomatic strategies—importance of Israel, Scuds and Palestinians; media and the war—CNN, Scud Stud; invasion and Powell Doctrine; no-fly zones and Bush response; UN sanctions and WMDs)

April 2 Notes

The Reagan Agenda

April 2, 2008

I. The Carter Years
1. Carter and the Middle East Peace Process (Sadat and Begin; nature of settlement; limited political benefits)

2. The Iranian Revolution (US intelligence failure; death of regime; hostages and “rescue mission”; crisis and its effects)

3. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Brezhnev Doctrine and invasion; origins of mujahadin)

II. Documents of U.S. Foreign Policy

1. FRUS (Seward and government openness; development of 30-year rule; post-WWII bureaucratization and State Dept. Historian’s Office; pre-1961: http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/; post-1961: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/)

2. Other Sources (FDR and development of presidential library system; Watergate and presidential papers; FOIA and foreign policy; National Security Archive: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/)

3. Approaches to Field (journalists and independent scholars; diplomatic history; theory, public policy, and political science)

III. Reagan and the Middle East

1. The Reagan Team (election of 1980 and altered American political culture; growth of defense budget; importance of William Casey, Haig, Kirkpatrick; nomination of Lefever; Weinberger; increasing importance of NSC)

2. AWACS (Big Oil and Saudi alliance; altered strategic situation—Iran/Iraq war; Yemen, Ethiopia, Sadat assassination; Reagan and confronting Congress; Israel Lobby and House rejection; significance of Jepsen; final Senate vote)

IV. Iran-Contra

1. Lebanon and Iran (Reagan and international terrorism; Israeli invasion of Lebanon; US troops to Lebanon: War Powers Act and Hezbollah terrorist attack; hostages and US response; search for the Iran “moderates”; role of NSC; diversion of funds to contras)

2. The Scandal Breaks (Hasenfus and crash; from Lebanon to Washington; Meese investigation; Tower Committee; what was Reagan’s role? Bush’s; Inouye Committee and North as GOP folk hero)

Year	Defense budget	Year	Defense budget
1977	$97.2B	1979	$116.3B
1980	$134.0B	1981	$157.5B
1982	$185.3B	1983	$209.9B
1984	$227.4B	1985	$252.8B

March 31 Notes

The Carter Years

March 31, 2008

I. Transforming Middle East International Relations
1. The War (Nixon, Sadat, and realpolitik; nature of war Kissinger, Nixon, and constitutional crisis)

2. Postwar Arab Diplomacy (origins of OPEC diplomacy and transformation of Middle East—strains in European alliance)

3. The Eagleton Amendment and Its Effects (Turkish invasion of Cyprus, new internationalists, and Greek Lobby; reaction and view of erratic congressional power)

II. Human Rights Diplomacy

1. From Ford to Carter (Ford transition; attacks on Kissingerian foreign policy: Jackson and neoconservative critique of détente, Reagan and conservative critique of détente; Ford political readjustments and effect on Middle East peace process; Carter bid: Iowa & New Hampshire, anti-Washington appeal, weaknesses of major rivals; campaign and Ford revival; Carter victory; foreign policy apparatus—Vance, Brzezinski, Derian)

2. Carter and the Middle East Matters (energy policy and attempt to weaken OPEC; leadership problems and Democratic divisions; failure; Egypt-Israeli peace process: reviving Kissinger’s agenda; Sadat and realpolitik; Meir, Rabin, and collapse of Labor; Begin victory; nature of settlement; limited political benefits—Panama Canal Treaties, 1978 elections)

III. The Collapse of Carter’s Regional Policy

1. The Iranian Revolution (Carter and the Shah; Derian and foreign aid; weakening of Shah; US intelligence failure—trapped in the 1950s?; death of regime; second oil shock; from Bani-Sadr to Khomeini; hostages and American popular culture; “rescue mission” and resignation of Vance; crisis and its effects)

2. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (great game and Afghanistan’s role in regional affairs; from Zahir Shah to 1978 coup; assassination of Amin and Soviet intervention; changing international context—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan; Carter administration response—failure of intelligence analysis, doves, SALT, and wishful thinking?, role of Brzezinski and origins of covert campaign; international response—role of UN, India, 1980 Moscow Olympics; initial Soviet successes)

3. The Path to CENTCOM (strategic shift: hostage crisis, Afghan invasion, and path to “Carter Doctrine”; Carter indecision, bureaucratic rivalries within military; early 1980s decisions; importance of Diego Garcia; Cold War framework)

March 26 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Transforming Middle East International Relations

March 26, 2008

I. The Nixon Effect
1. New Regional Structure? (détente and opening to PRC; openings to Iran, Pakistan)

2. Bureaucratic Rivalries (Kissinger vs. Rogers, Nixon’s conspiracy theories)

3. New Threats (terrorism; Jordan)

II. The 1973 War and Its Effects

1. Nixon and Sadat (Egypt and creation of anti-Israel alliance—importance of Iraq and Libya, resumption of relations with Syria, squeezing Jordan; Sadat and the Soviets; Sadat and Nixon—role of realpolitik: adversaries or allies?; missed opportunity?)

2. War & Consequences (Israeli intelligence failure; legacy of preemption; Egyptian and Syrian advances; failure of mediation and US decision to airlift; Brezhnev role—testing limitations of détente?; Kissinger, Nixon, and constitutional crisis—nuclear mobilization; reversal of fortunes; path to cease-fire)

3. Postwar Arab Diplomacy (origins of OPEC diplomacy and transformation of Middle East—importance of Saudi Arabia, strains in European alliance; US decisionmaking structure and renewed questions about Nixon; Cold War framework: Zionism-as-racism resolution)

III. Crisis Points

1. The Eagleton Amendment and Its Effects (colonels’ regime, coup, and Turkish invasion; Congress—new internationalists: arms sales issue: Symington and Pakistan, Nelson-Bingham amendment, Middle East as venue; Greek lobby—importance of Sarbanes and Brademas, imitating Israeli lobby; path to Eagleton amendment; reaction—Kissinger, Turkey and US bases, congressional retreat; legacy: erratic congressional role, discrediting new internationalists?, significance of Turkey)

2. Carter and the Middle East Peace Process (Sadat and realpolitik; Meir, Rabin, and collapse of Labor; Begin victory; Carter and foreign policy—1976 campaign, odd arrangement—Vance, Brzezinski, Derian; nature of settlement; limited political benefits)

3. The Iranian Revolution (Carter and the Shah; Derian and foreign aid; weakening of Shah; US intelligence failure—trapped in the 1950s?; death of regime; second oil shock; from Bani-Sadr to Khomeini; hostages and American popular culture; “rescue mission” and resignation of Vance; crisis and its effects)

4. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Afghanistan and the great game; deposition Zahir Shah and beginning of instability; Islam and Communism; Brezhnev Doctrine and assassination of Amin; Karmal presidency and invasion; origins of mujahadin)

/BBC

March 24 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Middle East Realpolitik

March 24, 2008

I. LBJ and the Middle East

1. LBJ and Foreign Policy (domestic concerns; bureaucratic approach; view of Israel)

2. Background to 1967 War (U.S. arms sales; rising tensions between Israel and neighbors; growing Soviet role; LBJ and the Middle East)

3. The Conflict (Jordanian decision to intervene and balance of power; U.S. response)

II. From LBJ to Nixon

1. Aftermath of War (increased Soviet presence; land for peace and UN 242; French reversal; U.S. policy: Israel and sale of Phantoms; maintaining regional allies: oil diplomacy, significance of military aid—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran; tensions with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; European influence—Lebanon, Gulf region)

2. Nixon (Nixon background: political decline, refashioning himself as foreign policy expert, transition from anti-communist extremist to elder statesmen, Six Crises and overall approach; Nixon, Kissinger, and transforming international affairs: Vietnamization—from “peace with honor” to a “decent interval”; opening to China and triumph of realpolitik; détente and Soviet Union—path to SALT I; difficulties with Congress)

III. A Realigned Middle East

1. Realigning U.S. Middle Eastern Policy (search for new anchors—Iran: role of Shah, strategic concerns, relationship with Israel, preference for authoritarianism; Pakistan: background, Pakistan-PRC-United States triangle, Nixon and India, long-term effects)

2. Early Regional Initiatives (Kissinger/Rogers tensions and State/NSC relationship; Nixon paranoia and establishment of secret government; Rogers and Jordan; United States, Israel, and 1970 Jordanian crisis; Nixon and Israel; Nixon, Vietnam, and American Jews)

3. Terrorism (emergence of terrorism: European far left—aftermath of 1968, Red Army Fraction and West Germany, anti-semitism and European terrorism; alliance between European and Palestinian terror groups; internal Palestinian battles; Munich massacre; U.S. approach)

4. The 1973 War (Egypt and creation of anti-Israel alliance—importance of Iraq and Libya, resumption of relations with Syria, squeezing Jordan; Sadat and the Soviets; outbreak of war and Israeli intelligence failure; legacy of preemption; Egyptian and Syrian advances; failure of mediation and US decision to airlift; Brezhnev role—testing limitations of détente?; Kissinger, Nixon, and constitutional crisis—nuclear mobilization; reversal of fortunes; path to cease-fire)

March 24 Reading

Nixon documents, relating to the 1973 war:

• Memorandum of Conversation [Memcon] between Muhammad Hafez Ismail and Henry Kissinger, 20 May 1973
• Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for the President's Files, "President's Meeting with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on Saturday, June 23, 1973"
• Brezhnev to Nixon, 24 October 1973
• Nixon to Brezhnev, 25 October 1973
• Memcon, "Meeting with Oil Company Executives," 5:30 p.m., 26 October 1973
• Kissinger memorandum for the President's File, "Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin on Tuesday, October 30, 1973"
• Memcon between Meir, Nixon, and Kissinger, 1 November 1973

LBJ--New Tapes

At another point in their call, Eisenhower turned back to events of his administration, urging the President to revive the Johnston Plan. (The President seemed more interested in eating.)

But Kosygin wasn’t interested—while Eisenhower and Johnson shared a bit of triumphalism about the current situation in the Middle East (we heard the second part of this clip in class).

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Dwight Eisenhower: As I study this problem, there’s two in the Mideast—two problems—that have got to be settled before there’s ever going to be any, even a modus operandi there in the Mideast. One of them is water, and the other one is these refugees.

Now, they can be tied up, it seems to me, if we could set up a scheme of a corporation, a world corporation, something like they started out with the Suez Canal, or this atomic thing in Vienna [IAEA].

Suppose our government bought 51 percent of the stock, and then we built, in succession, three great big salt purification plants along there in the Levant, the eastern Mediterranean. And to sell the stock to bankers all around the world, and so on. Make the water problem there—I mean, a water solution—make it so attractive that both sides would be almost compelled by their people to take it. [The President chomps on his food.]

For example, I’ve been talking to some of these AEC people—scientists, scientific people—they say that without too expensive a thing, you could put 500 million, or up to a billion, gallons a day, and water much of Israel, Jordan, Egypt east of the Suez, and some of Syria, probably.

Well, now—you see, we had that old Jordan River thing [the Johnston Plan] that you could do something—

President Johnson: I broached that to him this afternoon.

Eisenhower: Did you?

President Johnson: I didn’t get any comment. I told him that our people had talked to me about it just before the meeting.

Eisenhower: Yeah.

President Johnson: He said, “Well, I just want to say this. I don’t think we can talk about anything else until you get the troops withdrawn.” He said, “We’re referees in a fight, and you’ve got to get your man by the nape of the neck, and I got to get our man by the nape of the neck, and you’ve got to separate them and put them back in their corner.” [Eisenhower chuckles.] He said, “Then we can talk about other things.”

Eisenhower: Oh, well, about their man, though—they have to pick him up and revive him. [Both laugh.] That’s the difference.

President Johnson: Well . . .

Lyndon Johnson was a President unusually sensitive to the domestic impact of his foreign policy decisions.

So it came as little surprise that the President was concerned with how Middle Eastern affairs played on the domestic front. In this clip from the Dirksen call, Johnson complained about how American Jews such as Goldberg and New York senator Jacob Javits were poor representatives for the Israeli cause.

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Everett Dirksen: They read me a long cable tonight, that covered that [Saudi King] Faisal meeting.

President Johnson: Well, I have that. We got that in our intelligence. It was very good. His people told it to us, too. And the Kuwaits [sic] have been pretty good.

Dirksen: Yeah. So they have.

President Johnson: The Arabs cannot unify behind anything ever except the Jews.

Dirksen: Well, now—

President Johnson: And if the goddamn Jews had behaved, and be quiet, and let you talk for them or let [Majority Leader Mike] Mansfield talk for them, or let somebody else—instead of Goldberg and [New York senator Jacob] Javits and all them . . .

That just sets them afire when they get up—

Dirksen: Yeah.

President Johnson: They just get afire.

Dirksen: By the way, you didn’t forget to tell [Undersecretary of State] Nick [Katzenbach] to get on Jack [unclear], did you?

President Johnson: I told Nick to come talk to you, and get your judgments on it. He’s not for the resolution.

Dirksen: No.

President Johnson: He thinks we oughtn’t to have any resolution.

Dirksen: Yeah. Well, Jack [Javits] was working like a goddamn eager beaver, you know.

President Johnson: Well, he wants to, and I can understand his concern. I’d be worried if it was Texans. But it’s not wise. That’s not the best thing,

Dirksen: Yeah.

President Johnson: Because somebody else . . . You know, it’s a man that’s a fool that is his own lawyer.

Dirksen: Yeah. But the hell of it is you can’t talk him out of it when he gets these ideas. And then he just scours that goddamn [Senate] floor.

President Johnson: Yeah.

Dirksen: Saying, “Will you join with me in this resolution?”