March 31 Notes

The Carter Years

March 31, 2008

I. Transforming Middle East International Relations
1. The War (Nixon, Sadat, and realpolitik; nature of war Kissinger, Nixon, and constitutional crisis)

2. Postwar Arab Diplomacy (origins of OPEC diplomacy and transformation of Middle East—strains in European alliance)

3. The Eagleton Amendment and Its Effects (Turkish invasion of Cyprus, new internationalists, and Greek Lobby; reaction and view of erratic congressional power)

II. Human Rights Diplomacy

1. From Ford to Carter (Ford transition; attacks on Kissingerian foreign policy: Jackson and neoconservative critique of détente, Reagan and conservative critique of détente; Ford political readjustments and effect on Middle East peace process; Carter bid: Iowa & New Hampshire, anti-Washington appeal, weaknesses of major rivals; campaign and Ford revival; Carter victory; foreign policy apparatus—Vance, Brzezinski, Derian)

2. Carter and the Middle East Matters (energy policy and attempt to weaken OPEC; leadership problems and Democratic divisions; failure; Egypt-Israeli peace process: reviving Kissinger’s agenda; Sadat and realpolitik; Meir, Rabin, and collapse of Labor; Begin victory; nature of settlement; limited political benefits—Panama Canal Treaties, 1978 elections)

III. The Collapse of Carter’s Regional Policy

1. The Iranian Revolution (Carter and the Shah; Derian and foreign aid; weakening of Shah; US intelligence failure—trapped in the 1950s?; death of regime; second oil shock; from Bani-Sadr to Khomeini; hostages and American popular culture; “rescue mission” and resignation of Vance; crisis and its effects)

2. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (great game and Afghanistan’s role in regional affairs; from Zahir Shah to 1978 coup; assassination of Amin and Soviet intervention; changing international context—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan; Carter administration response—failure of intelligence analysis, doves, SALT, and wishful thinking?, role of Brzezinski and origins of covert campaign; international response—role of UN, India, 1980 Moscow Olympics; initial Soviet successes)

3. The Path to CENTCOM (strategic shift: hostage crisis, Afghan invasion, and path to “Carter Doctrine”; Carter indecision, bureaucratic rivalries within military; early 1980s decisions; importance of Diego Garcia; Cold War framework)

March 26 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Transforming Middle East International Relations

March 26, 2008

I. The Nixon Effect
1. New Regional Structure? (détente and opening to PRC; openings to Iran, Pakistan)

2. Bureaucratic Rivalries (Kissinger vs. Rogers, Nixon’s conspiracy theories)

3. New Threats (terrorism; Jordan)

II. The 1973 War and Its Effects

1. Nixon and Sadat (Egypt and creation of anti-Israel alliance—importance of Iraq and Libya, resumption of relations with Syria, squeezing Jordan; Sadat and the Soviets; Sadat and Nixon—role of realpolitik: adversaries or allies?; missed opportunity?)

2. War & Consequences (Israeli intelligence failure; legacy of preemption; Egyptian and Syrian advances; failure of mediation and US decision to airlift; Brezhnev role—testing limitations of détente?; Kissinger, Nixon, and constitutional crisis—nuclear mobilization; reversal of fortunes; path to cease-fire)

3. Postwar Arab Diplomacy (origins of OPEC diplomacy and transformation of Middle East—importance of Saudi Arabia, strains in European alliance; US decisionmaking structure and renewed questions about Nixon; Cold War framework: Zionism-as-racism resolution)

III. Crisis Points

1. The Eagleton Amendment and Its Effects (colonels’ regime, coup, and Turkish invasion; Congress—new internationalists: arms sales issue: Symington and Pakistan, Nelson-Bingham amendment, Middle East as venue; Greek lobby—importance of Sarbanes and Brademas, imitating Israeli lobby; path to Eagleton amendment; reaction—Kissinger, Turkey and US bases, congressional retreat; legacy: erratic congressional role, discrediting new internationalists?, significance of Turkey)

2. Carter and the Middle East Peace Process (Sadat and realpolitik; Meir, Rabin, and collapse of Labor; Begin victory; Carter and foreign policy—1976 campaign, odd arrangement—Vance, Brzezinski, Derian; nature of settlement; limited political benefits)

3. The Iranian Revolution (Carter and the Shah; Derian and foreign aid; weakening of Shah; US intelligence failure—trapped in the 1950s?; death of regime; second oil shock; from Bani-Sadr to Khomeini; hostages and American popular culture; “rescue mission” and resignation of Vance; crisis and its effects)

4. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Afghanistan and the great game; deposition Zahir Shah and beginning of instability; Islam and Communism; Brezhnev Doctrine and assassination of Amin; Karmal presidency and invasion; origins of mujahadin)

/BBC

March 24 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Middle East Realpolitik

March 24, 2008

I. LBJ and the Middle East

1. LBJ and Foreign Policy (domestic concerns; bureaucratic approach; view of Israel)

2. Background to 1967 War (U.S. arms sales; rising tensions between Israel and neighbors; growing Soviet role; LBJ and the Middle East)

3. The Conflict (Jordanian decision to intervene and balance of power; U.S. response)

II. From LBJ to Nixon

1. Aftermath of War (increased Soviet presence; land for peace and UN 242; French reversal; U.S. policy: Israel and sale of Phantoms; maintaining regional allies: oil diplomacy, significance of military aid—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran; tensions with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; European influence—Lebanon, Gulf region)

2. Nixon (Nixon background: political decline, refashioning himself as foreign policy expert, transition from anti-communist extremist to elder statesmen, Six Crises and overall approach; Nixon, Kissinger, and transforming international affairs: Vietnamization—from “peace with honor” to a “decent interval”; opening to China and triumph of realpolitik; détente and Soviet Union—path to SALT I; difficulties with Congress)

III. A Realigned Middle East

1. Realigning U.S. Middle Eastern Policy (search for new anchors—Iran: role of Shah, strategic concerns, relationship with Israel, preference for authoritarianism; Pakistan: background, Pakistan-PRC-United States triangle, Nixon and India, long-term effects)

2. Early Regional Initiatives (Kissinger/Rogers tensions and State/NSC relationship; Nixon paranoia and establishment of secret government; Rogers and Jordan; United States, Israel, and 1970 Jordanian crisis; Nixon and Israel; Nixon, Vietnam, and American Jews)

3. Terrorism (emergence of terrorism: European far left—aftermath of 1968, Red Army Fraction and West Germany, anti-semitism and European terrorism; alliance between European and Palestinian terror groups; internal Palestinian battles; Munich massacre; U.S. approach)

4. The 1973 War (Egypt and creation of anti-Israel alliance—importance of Iraq and Libya, resumption of relations with Syria, squeezing Jordan; Sadat and the Soviets; outbreak of war and Israeli intelligence failure; legacy of preemption; Egyptian and Syrian advances; failure of mediation and US decision to airlift; Brezhnev role—testing limitations of détente?; Kissinger, Nixon, and constitutional crisis—nuclear mobilization; reversal of fortunes; path to cease-fire)

March 24 Reading

Nixon documents, relating to the 1973 war:

• Memorandum of Conversation [Memcon] between Muhammad Hafez Ismail and Henry Kissinger, 20 May 1973
• Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for the President's Files, "President's Meeting with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on Saturday, June 23, 1973"
• Brezhnev to Nixon, 24 October 1973
• Nixon to Brezhnev, 25 October 1973
• Memcon, "Meeting with Oil Company Executives," 5:30 p.m., 26 October 1973
• Kissinger memorandum for the President's File, "Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin on Tuesday, October 30, 1973"
• Memcon between Meir, Nixon, and Kissinger, 1 November 1973

LBJ--New Tapes

At another point in their call, Eisenhower turned back to events of his administration, urging the President to revive the Johnston Plan. (The President seemed more interested in eating.)

But Kosygin wasn’t interested—while Eisenhower and Johnson shared a bit of triumphalism about the current situation in the Middle East (we heard the second part of this clip in class).

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Dwight Eisenhower: As I study this problem, there’s two in the Mideast—two problems—that have got to be settled before there’s ever going to be any, even a modus operandi there in the Mideast. One of them is water, and the other one is these refugees.

Now, they can be tied up, it seems to me, if we could set up a scheme of a corporation, a world corporation, something like they started out with the Suez Canal, or this atomic thing in Vienna [IAEA].

Suppose our government bought 51 percent of the stock, and then we built, in succession, three great big salt purification plants along there in the Levant, the eastern Mediterranean. And to sell the stock to bankers all around the world, and so on. Make the water problem there—I mean, a water solution—make it so attractive that both sides would be almost compelled by their people to take it. [The President chomps on his food.]

For example, I’ve been talking to some of these AEC people—scientists, scientific people—they say that without too expensive a thing, you could put 500 million, or up to a billion, gallons a day, and water much of Israel, Jordan, Egypt east of the Suez, and some of Syria, probably.

Well, now—you see, we had that old Jordan River thing [the Johnston Plan] that you could do something—

President Johnson: I broached that to him this afternoon.

Eisenhower: Did you?

President Johnson: I didn’t get any comment. I told him that our people had talked to me about it just before the meeting.

Eisenhower: Yeah.

President Johnson: He said, “Well, I just want to say this. I don’t think we can talk about anything else until you get the troops withdrawn.” He said, “We’re referees in a fight, and you’ve got to get your man by the nape of the neck, and I got to get our man by the nape of the neck, and you’ve got to separate them and put them back in their corner.” [Eisenhower chuckles.] He said, “Then we can talk about other things.”

Eisenhower: Oh, well, about their man, though—they have to pick him up and revive him. [Both laugh.] That’s the difference.

President Johnson: Well . . .

Lyndon Johnson was a President unusually sensitive to the domestic impact of his foreign policy decisions.

So it came as little surprise that the President was concerned with how Middle Eastern affairs played on the domestic front. In this clip from the Dirksen call, Johnson complained about how American Jews such as Goldberg and New York senator Jacob Javits were poor representatives for the Israeli cause.

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Everett Dirksen: They read me a long cable tonight, that covered that [Saudi King] Faisal meeting.

President Johnson: Well, I have that. We got that in our intelligence. It was very good. His people told it to us, too. And the Kuwaits [sic] have been pretty good.

Dirksen: Yeah. So they have.

President Johnson: The Arabs cannot unify behind anything ever except the Jews.

Dirksen: Well, now—

President Johnson: And if the goddamn Jews had behaved, and be quiet, and let you talk for them or let [Majority Leader Mike] Mansfield talk for them, or let somebody else—instead of Goldberg and [New York senator Jacob] Javits and all them . . .

That just sets them afire when they get up—

Dirksen: Yeah.

President Johnson: They just get afire.

Dirksen: By the way, you didn’t forget to tell [Undersecretary of State] Nick [Katzenbach] to get on Jack [unclear], did you?

President Johnson: I told Nick to come talk to you, and get your judgments on it. He’s not for the resolution.

Dirksen: No.

President Johnson: He thinks we oughtn’t to have any resolution.

Dirksen: Yeah. Well, Jack [Javits] was working like a goddamn eager beaver, you know.

President Johnson: Well, he wants to, and I can understand his concern. I’d be worried if it was Texans. But it’s not wise. That’s not the best thing,

Dirksen: Yeah.

President Johnson: Because somebody else . . . You know, it’s a man that’s a fool that is his own lawyer.

Dirksen: Yeah. But the hell of it is you can’t talk him out of it when he gets these ideas. And then he just scours that goddamn [Senate] floor.

President Johnson: Yeah.

Dirksen: Saying, “Will you join with me in this resolution?”

1963 Tapes--Extras

With National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Ass't Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert Strong, President Kennedy discusses (April 1963) the possibility of a U.S. territorial guarantee to Israel. Bundy concludes the conversation on a pessimistic note.




In the aftermath of a Syrian-Egyptian overture to Jordan's King Hussein, President Kennedy asks his advisors about the value of U.S. aid to Nasser.




In spring 1963, concerned about rumors of a coup against King Hussein in Jordan, Kennedy and his advisors discuss the need for European backing of a status quo solution in the region. (David Ormsby-Gore was the British ambassador to the U.S., and an old Kennedy friend.)




Another spring 1963 conversation between Kennedy and his aides, with the President worrying that U.S. economic aid to Nasser might provide Israel with an excuse for a preemptive strike against Nasser.

March 19 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

LBJ and Israel

March 19, 2008

I. Kennedy and the Middle East

1. Democracy and Development (Iran as case study: tension between democracy and anti-communism; from land reform to White Revolution; turn toward Israel)

2. Nuclear Diplomacy (decision for Jupiters; Khrushchev and missile crisis diplomacy; Dimona and NPT)

3. The Foreign Aid Revolt (postwar constitutional transformations; left-right coalitions; significance of policy riders)

II. LBJ and the World

1. The Transition from Kennedy (establishing an image: healer after tragedy, legislative tactician, commitment to civil rights; recalibrating advisors: increased prominence of Rusk, McNamara, Bundy; foreign policy through a domestic prism: 1964 election, Panama and Cuba affairs, Lodge, Vietnam, and Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Goldwater challenge and nuclear issue; ouster of Khrushchev and long-term effects)

2. Interest in the Middle East (LBJ and vision of Israel; U.S. and brokering of tank deal; Jordan crisis—UAC, weakness of King Hussein, fear of Soviet influence, Israeli and W. German political divisions; joint arms sales and road to Skyhawks)

III. The United States and the Six Day War

1. Johnson’s Dilemmas (Great Society and Americanization of Vietnam War—“guns and butter” approach; urban unrest and political realignment—1966 elections; liberal revolt—Fulbright Hearings; Church, Symington, and military aid, role of RFK)

2. War and American Diplomacy (Nasser diplomacy and impact of Soviets; State Department, pressures on Eshkol government, and question of preemption; Eshkol domestic weaknesses; start of war and LBJ response; three-front victory and international pressure; Liberty and Israeli-American relations)

3. Aftermath (role of UN: Cold War tensions, U.S. and the Occupied Territories, Third World effects, path to 242; international realignments—France, Soviet Union; Israeli-U.S. strategic partnership—LBJ and Goldberg, 1968 Phantom sale)

March 17 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Kennedy and the Middle East

March 17, 2008

I. Dual Containment

1. Eisenhower and Nasser (Aswan Dam; Nasser’s turn east; US and the Suez intervention)

2. Containing Nasser (Syria and covert ops; significance of Iraq and Pakistan; collapse of Baghdad Pact)

3. The Fringes: Algeria (FLN and launching of war; US response; domestic pressure; end of war)

II. Kennedy and the Middle East
1. Democracy and Development (Iran as case study: 1950s legacy—martial law, rigged elections, growing popular discontent; Kennedy and the Third World: counterinsurgency, promotion of democracy—Latin America, Vietnam; Iran as model for Middle East?: developmental aid, democratic surge; Shah’s response—military aid, heighten fear of communism, growth of SAVAK; turning point: US and Amini government—withdrawal of support, road to “White Revolution”)

2. The Turn toward Israel (DDE legacy and improving relations late 1950s?; JFK: Israel as model?—Kennedy and developmentalism; politics—Democratic coalition; Nasser and Cold War concerns—significance of Yemen intervention and Jordan crisis; decision to sell Hawk missiles; limitations: question of refugees)

3. Nuclear Diplomacy (Turkey: Jupiters and the Eisenhower legacy; Kennedy and reconsideration; Turkish resistance; Khrushchev, Castro, and origins of Cuban Missile Crisis; Turkey and Jupiters; ramifications; Kennedy and nonproliferation; tensions over Dimona; Ben Gurion, Eshkol, and inspection)

4. The Foreign Aid Revolt (postwar constitutional transformations; expansion of foreign aid and origins of policy riders—Hickenlooper amendment; left-right coalition and significance of Passman in House, “dissenting liberals” in Senate; 1963 bill; Gruening-Keating amendment and foreign aid to aggressor states; LBJ inability to shape outcome)

	Total	Military aid	Economic aid	Food for Peace
1954	$74.7M	0	$54M	$20.7M
1955	52.7M	0	41.5M	11.2M
1956	50.8M	0	24M	26.8M
1957	40.9M	0	26.8M	14.1M
1958	61.2M	0	24M	37.2M
1959	50.3M	$.4M	19.2M	30.7M
1960	55.7M	.5M	23.9M	31.3M
1961	45.1M	0	24.5M	23.6M
1962	83.9M	13.2M	45.4M	25.3M
1963	76.7M	13.3M	45M	18.4M

March 17 Reading: Nuclear Issues

• Avner Cohen, “Israel and the Origins of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy: The Crucial Decade, 1958-1968,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 1988, pp. 1-19.

Documents:

• Consequences of Israel Acquiring a Nuclear Capability: CIA memo
  
• Kennedy Wants Semi-Annual Visits to Dimona (5/10/63)
• Rusk, McCone Discuss Israeli Nuclear Program

March 12 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Dual Containment

March 12, 2008

I. Cold War Comes to the Middle East

1. Closing Out Truman (difficulties of the MEC; effects of NSC-68; Israel & the Cold War: confluence of domestic politics and international realities; path to NSC 47/2)

2. The New Look (NSC 162/2: role of economy, massive retaliation, covert operations)

3. Transforming the Middle East (Iranian coup; water diplomacy and collapse of Johnston Plan)

II. The Road to Suez

1. Nasser’s Egypt (U.S. background with Nasser; United States and Anglo-Egyptian base settlement; aid and Israel; limitations—necessities of Anglo-Am alliance; effect of base settlement—rise of pan-Arab rhetoric, tensions with Israel; Nasser’s turn east—Bandung, Czech arms deal)

2. Containing Nasser (Syria: internal instability and CIA involvement; NSC 5412; Eisenhower and Malki regime; assassination and anti-American surge—rise of Ba’athists; creation of Baghdad Pact—significance of Iraq, pulling Pakistan in; question of Jordanian membership; U.S. outside support)

3. Suez (the Aswan Dam debate; origins of Project OMEGA; creation of anti-Nasser alliance: Eden and Munich analogy, France and Algerian war, Israel and French weapons supply; keeping Eisenhower in dark; Hungarian uprising—Secret Speech, rollback rhetoric, Soviet intervention, Nagy death; invasion launched and DDE response; withdrawal, Eden resignation, and UN settlement)

III. Beyond Suez

1. Syria (Operation STRAGGLE to Operation WAPPEN; creation of U.A.R. 1958; U.S. assistance in creation of SAVAK)

2. Collapse (DDE and congressional power: Formosa Doctrine as precedent; debate over Eisenhower Doctrine—constitutional questions, Democratic divisions; implementation: Qassem coup in Iraq; powers’ response—Britain to Jordan, U.S. to Lebanon; rise and fall of Chamoun; Israel: DDE vision, moderate public support, Douglas amendment and congressional role)

3. The Fringes (Algeria: French postwar position and political culture—limitations of 4^th Republic, outbreak of revolt and FLN, role of international public opinion, alternative to Cold War?, Kennedy speech and American anti-colonial traditions, DDE difficulties; Turkey: Eisenhower and nuclear weapons, decision to build Jupiters: US-British tensions, domestic pressures, limits of DDE theories; effects of Sputnik and offer to all NATO; who will take?: limitations of Greece, Italy, West Germany; decision to station in Turkey; ramifications)

March 10 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

The Effects of the Cold War

March 10, 2008

I. Origins of Cold War

1. Turkey & Iran (Soviet pressures—Azerbaijan, straits, northeast, Kurdistan; path to Truman Doctrine)

2. North Africa (wartime legacy, fate of Libya, Arab League)

3. Truman and Israel (stalling policy and hopes for UN peace process; decision to recognize)

II. Grand Strategies

1. Middle East after Korea (Northern Tier vs. Middle East: one region or two?; reaching out to Turkey; Shah and oil contracts; Egpyt’s strategic significance; Korean War and NSC-68, Turkey and collective security; contrasting views of security—United States, Britain, Egpyt, Turkey; Turkey to NATO, collapse of MEC and JCS stress on unilateral military activities)

2. Israel & the Cold War (post-recognition Israel and the world; “nation in arms,” border skirmishes, and arms sales: initial neutrality—significance of Britain, then France, role of Czechoslovakia; Israel and EE dictatorships: Romania, Stalin and Eastern Europe; battle against “cosmopolitanism”: Hungarian purgesàSlánský/Clementis show trials in Czechoslovakia; differing approaches FRG and DDR: Reparations Agreement in FRG, fall of Merker faction in DDR; China and diplomatic disarray; limits of U.S. support—limits to economic aid, path to NSC 47/2)

III. Eisenhower’s Effects

1. The New Look (rollback, McCarthyism, and the 1952 campaign—Republican coalition; NSC 162/2; role of economy; realism and end of Korean War; massive retaliation and Dulles; covert operations; role of Congress and McCarthyism; East Asian diplomacy and significance of Formosa Doctrine; where does Middle East fit in?)

2. Transforming the Middle East (Mussadiq, the Shah, and the 1953 coup; short- and long-term effects)

3. Water Diplomacy (Eisenhower and Israel: minimal economic aid, refusal of military assistance; Dulles and obstacles to peace: anti-Israel vision of regional security; Israel and water—Ben Gurion vision of Negev, decision to divert Jordan R. at Gesher B’not Ya’akov; UN response and threatened U.S. economic sanctions; economic development as alternative to Cold War?: Eric Johnston and TVA concept for Jordan Valley; Arab League rejection of Johnson Plan; Egypt: background with Nasser; desire for military aid; Nasser’s turn east—Bandung, Czech arms deal; US, Nasser, and Aswan Dam)

	1950	1951	1952
Defense budget	$13.3B	$60.4B	$44B
Army	591,000	1.55M	1.595M
Navy	451,000	1.01M	1.05M
Air Force	411,000	1.06M	973,000

Iran Coup: Documents

"Lessons" learned by US policymakers from the coup

US-UK oil diplomacy after the coup

March 5 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

The Cold War Comes to the Middle East

March 5, 2008

I. World War II

1. Northern Tier (Turkish strategic neutrality; Iran and path to Anglo-Soviet invasion)

2. North Africa (significance of Italy; FDR strategic vision and Operation TORCD; Darlan Deal)

3. Middle East (FDR and Jewish refugees; role of Grand Mufti; formalizing U.S.-Saudi alliance)

II. Setting the Stage

1. The World the War Created (Europe: devastation Germany and Italy; Red Army Liberation EE; French and British economic devastation; East Asia: pressure for decolonization—SE Asia, Vietnam, Indonesia, India; Chinese Civil War; Latin America—redeem wartime promises?; nuclear weapons; Middle East—Northern Tier, Palestine question)

2. Harry Truman and Foreign Policy (Truman reliance on State Department and contrast from FDR; importance of Kennan—Long Telegram and interpretation of Soviet behavior; role of European allies—ties among official classes; pulling US in—Churchill and Iron Curtain speech, Monnet and EC, Adenauer and German politics; crisis atmosphere: diplomatic stalemate, Soviet espionage, Wallace attack on HST, midterm elections and their effect; role of Congress: Democratic divisions and importance of Republicans; Vandenberg, Smith, HC Lodge—provide ideological justification; role of official class—Lovett, McCloy, Harriman, etc.; military)

III. The Middle East Role

1. Iran (wartime divisions and Soviet promises; contradictory Soviet goals: Azerbaijan and Kurdish separatist movements, Tudeh coup?, desire for oil; Shah/Ahmad Qavam rivalry; US hesitation—significance of Long Telegram; appeals to UN; Soviet withdrawal and increased tensions)

2. Turkey (World War II legacy; Soviet pressures—straits, northeast, Kurdistan; US military reaction; Greek civil war and US dilemmas; Missouri to Instanbul; Truman and Congress; path to Truman Doctrine—100K mil aid; effects amidst increased tensions—Czech coup, Berlin airlift, collapse of KMT; structural changes: National Security Act—creation of Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, NSC; establishment of national security state; contrasting visions of American role in world affairs)

3. North Africa (wartime legacy: British-American tensions, FDR, and question of imperialism; Egypt and US open door philosophy; fate of Libya—British desire for Cyrenaica, Soviet demand for joint trusteeship with Italy, US opposition to both; idea of Libyan independence as alternative—British support from Arab League, compromises on Somalia; independence)

4. Israel (FDR’s record: refugees, opposition to congressional action; postwar shift in opinion—Truman, congressional pressure, displaced persons (500,000); British recalcitrance; partition proposal; pressures on Truman—Congress, American Jews, State Department Arabists, military, fear of being outflanked by Soviets; stalling policy—supporting partition, arms embargo, trustee?; decision to recognize; limitations of move; Israeli foreign policy and Cold War)

Israel Recognition: Documents

Memo from Frank P. Corrigan, summary of Palestine Problem (2 pages) Printer Friendly Version (PDF)

Draft of "The Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine", February 17, 1948 (14 pages) Printer Friendly Version (PDF)

Memo supporting a Statement by Truman recognizing Israel, May 9, 1948 (8 pages) Printer Friendly Version (PDF)

George Marshall to Harry S. Truman, August 16, 1948 (3 pages) Printer Friendly Version (PDF)

Telegrams between Robert Lovett, George Marshall, and Harry S. Truman, September 1948 (6 pages) Printer Friendly Version (PDF)

George Marshall to Harry S. Truman, September 8, 1948 (3 pages) Printer Friendly Version (PDF)

March 3 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

World War II in the Middle East and North Africa

March 3, 2008

I. Aftermath of War

1. The Rise & Fall of the Sèvres System (Wilson’s political and personal collapse; treaty and Turkish reaction; Lausanne and quiet US support for Turks)

2. The Origins of Oil Diplomacy (Iraq, Red Line Agreement, and BFDC; development of Western cartel?)

3. Beyond the Red Line Agreement (emergence of Saudi Arabia: Ibn Saud and postwar world; Standard Oil, ARAMCO, and origins of US-Saudi alliance)

II. Road to World War II

1. Origins of War (flashpoints: Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Palestine, Turkey; Hitler and the Middle East—strategic: opening to Iraq, interest in Egypt; racial—Grand Mufti, Jewish/Arab tensions; British retreat from Balfour Declaration; Turkish neutrality; significance of Iran)

2. US and the Run-up to War (FDR strategic vision; domestic non-interventionism—isolationists, labor and immigration; strategic realities—“quarantine” speech, Welles mission, hostility of Chamberlain and negotiation of Munich agreement; the US and the Jewish question: USOC and Nazi Olympics, Jewish refugees—Morganthau, Ickes, and Eleanor Roosevelt vs. labor, State Department, FDR search for compromise—Alaska solution?, Dominican Republic idea; suspicion of Jewish leaders)

3. The Start of World War II (Nazi-Soviet Pact and invasion of Poland; fall of France and rise of Churchill; Italian entrance into war; Mussolini vision of new Roman Empire—Ethiopian, Albanian, Greek campaigns: pulling Germany into Balkans)

III. Effects on Middle East and North Africa

1. Northern Tier (Turkey: memories of WWI; from Ataturk to Inönü; alliance with Britain/Franc, non-aggression pact with Nazis—playing both sides; Inönü strategic calculations, Turkish strategic benefits, severing relations with Germany; minorities: economic pressures, Turkey and Holocaust; Iran: prewar flirtations with Nazis, path to Anglo-Soviet invasion—abdication of Reza Shah, signing of Tripartite Treaty, origins of U.S. involvement, Teheran and route to postwar problems)

2. North Africa (Italy and Britain, Libya and Greece; transfer of Rommel; US Entrance: FDR strategic vision; FDR and domestic politics; Churchill and Balkans, Stalin and Second Front, decision for North African campaign; Darlan Deal and complications of Vichy diplomacy; Britain and El Alemain; Operation TORCH and pincer campaign, Rommel defeat, fall of Tunisia—German POWs)

3. Middle East (Arab uprising and role of Grand Mufti; exile to Iraq, coup, and British invasion; Balkan campaigns and alliance with Hitler; creation of Lebanon; formalizing U.S.-Saudi alliance)