With National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Ass't Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert Strong, President Kennedy discusses (April 1963) the possibility of a U.S. territorial guarantee to Israel. Bundy concludes the conversation on a pessimistic note.
In the aftermath of a Syrian-Egyptian overture to Jordan's King Hussein, President Kennedy asks his advisors about the value of U.S. aid to Nasser.
In spring 1963, concerned about rumors of a coup against King Hussein in Jordan, Kennedy and his advisors discuss the need for European backing of a status quo solution in the region. (David Ormsby-Gore was the British ambassador to the U.S., and an old Kennedy friend.)
Another spring 1963 conversation between Kennedy and his aides, with the President worrying that U.S. economic aid to Nasser might provide Israel with an excuse for a preemptive strike against Nasser.
Friday, March 21, 2008
Tuesday, March 18, 2008
March 19 Notes
LBJ and
March 19, 2008
I. Kennedy and the
1. Democracy and Development (
2. Nuclear Diplomacy (decision for Jupiters; Khrushchev and missile crisis diplomacy; Dimona and NPT)
3. The Foreign Aid Revolt (postwar constitutional transformations; left-right coalitions; significance of policy riders)
II. LBJ and the World
1. The Transition from Kennedy (establishing an image: healer after tragedy, legislative tactician, commitment to civil rights; recalibrating advisors: increased prominence of Rusk, McNamara, Bundy; foreign policy through a domestic prism: 1964 election, Panama and Cuba affairs, Lodge, Vietnam, and Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Goldwater challenge and nuclear issue; ouster of Khrushchev and long-term effects)
2. Interest in the Middle East (LBJ and vision of Israel; U.S. and brokering of tank deal; Jordan crisis—UAC, weakness of King Hussein, fear of Soviet influence, Israeli and W. German political divisions; joint arms sales and road to Skyhawks)
III. The
1. Johnson’s Dilemmas (Great Society and Americanization of Vietnam War—“guns and butter” approach; urban unrest and political realignment—1966 elections; liberal revolt—Fulbright Hearings; Church, Symington, and military aid, role of RFK)
2. War and American Diplomacy (Nasser diplomacy and impact of Soviets; State Department, pressures on Eshkol government, and question of preemption; Eshkol domestic weaknesses; start of war and LBJ response; three-front victory and international pressure; Liberty and Israeli-American relations)
3. Aftermath (role of UN: Cold War tensions, U.S. and the Occupied Territories, Third World effects, path to 242; international realignments—France, Soviet Union; Israeli-U.S. strategic partnership—LBJ and Goldberg, 1968 Phantom sale)
March 17 Notes
Kennedy and the
March 17, 2008
I. Dual Containment
1. Eisenhower and Nasser (Aswan Dam; Nasser’s turn east; US and the
2. Containing Nasser (
3. The Fringes:
II. Kennedy and the
1. Democracy and Development (Iran as case study: 1950s legacy—martial law, rigged elections, growing popular discontent; Kennedy and the Third World: counterinsurgency, promotion of democracy—Latin America, Vietnam; Iran as model for Middle East?: developmental aid, democratic surge; Shah’s response—military aid, heighten fear of communism, growth of SAVAK; turning point: US and Amini government—withdrawal of support, road to “White Revolution”)
2. The Turn toward
3. Nuclear Diplomacy (
4. The Foreign Aid Revolt (postwar constitutional transformations; expansion of foreign aid and origins of policy riders—Hickenlooper amendment; left-right coalition and significance of Passman in House, “dissenting liberals” in Senate; 1963 bill; Gruening-Keating amendment and foreign aid to aggressor states; LBJ inability to shape outcome)
| | Total | Military aid | Economic aid | Food for Peace |
| 1954 | $74.7M | 0 | $54M | $20.7M |
| 1955 | 52.7M | 0 | 41.5M | 11.2M |
| 1956 | 50.8M | 0 | 24M | 26.8M |
| 1957 | 40.9M | 0 | 26.8M | 14.1M |
| 1958 | 61.2M | 0 | 24M | 37.2M |
| 1959 | 50.3M | $.4M | 19.2M | 30.7M |
| 1960 | 55.7M | .5M | 23.9M | 31.3M |
| 1961 | 45.1M | 0 | 24.5M | 23.6M |
| 1962 | 83.9M | 13.2M | 45.4M | 25.3M |
| 1963 | 76.7M | 13.3M | 45M | 18.4M |
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
March 17 Reading: Nuclear Issues
- Avner Cohen, “Israel and the Origins of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy: The Crucial Decade, 1958-1968,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 1988, pp. 1-19.
Documents:
March 12 Notes
Dual Containment
March 12, 2008
I. Cold War Comes to the
1. Closing Out Truman (difficulties of the MEC; effects of NSC-68;
2. The New Look (NSC 162/2: role of economy, massive retaliation, covert operations)
3. Transforming the
II. The Road to
1. Nasser’s
2. Containing Nasser (
3. Suez (the Aswan Dam debate; origins of Project OMEGA; creation of anti-Nasser alliance: Eden and Munich analogy, France and Algerian war, Israel and French weapons supply; keeping Eisenhower in dark; Hungarian uprising—Secret Speech, rollback rhetoric, Soviet intervention, Nagy death; invasion launched and DDE response; withdrawal, Eden resignation, and UN settlement)
III. Beyond
1.
2. Collapse (DDE and congressional power: Formosa Doctrine as precedent; debate over Eisenhower Doctrine—constitutional questions, Democratic divisions; implementation: Qassem coup in
3. The Fringes (Algeria: French postwar position and political culture—limitations of 4th Republic, outbreak of revolt and FLN, role of international public opinion, alternative to Cold War?, Kennedy speech and American anti-colonial traditions, DDE difficulties; Turkey: Eisenhower and nuclear weapons, decision to build Jupiters: US-British tensions, domestic pressures, limits of DDE theories; effects of Sputnik and offer to all NATO; who will take?: limitations of Greece, Italy, West Germany; decision to station in Turkey; ramifications)
Sunday, March 9, 2008
March 10 Notes
The Effects of the Cold War
March 10, 2008
I. Origins of Cold War
1. Turkey & Iran (Soviet pressures—
2. North Africa (wartime legacy, fate of
3. Truman and
II. Grand Strategies
1. Middle East after Korea (Northern Tier vs. Middle East: one region or two?; reaching out to Turkey; Shah and oil contracts; Egpyt’s strategic significance; Korean War and NSC-68, Turkey and collective security; contrasting views of security—United States, Britain, Egpyt, Turkey; Turkey to NATO, collapse of MEC and JCS stress on unilateral military activities)
2. Israel & the Cold War (post-recognition Israel and the world; “nation in arms,” border skirmishes, and arms sales: initial neutrality—significance of Britain, then France, role of Czechoslovakia; Israel and EE dictatorships: Romania, Stalin and Eastern Europe; battle against “cosmopolitanism”: Hungarian purgesàSlánský/Clementis show trials in Czechoslovakia; differing approaches FRG and DDR: Reparations Agreement in FRG, fall of Merker faction in DDR; China and diplomatic disarray; limits of U.S. support—limits to economic aid, path to NSC 47/2)
III. Eisenhower’s Effects
1. The New Look (rollback, McCarthyism, and the 1952 campaign—Republican coalition; NSC 162/2; role of economy; realism and end of Korean War; massive retaliation and Dulles; covert operations; role of Congress and McCarthyism; East Asian diplomacy and significance of Formosa Doctrine; where does Middle East fit in?)
2. Transforming the
3. Water Diplomacy (Eisenhower and Israel: minimal economic aid, refusal of military assistance; Dulles and obstacles to peace: anti-Israel vision of regional security; Israel and water—Ben Gurion vision of Negev, decision to divert Jordan R. at Gesher B’not Ya’akov; UN response and threatened U.S. economic sanctions; economic development as alternative to Cold War?: Eric Johnston and TVA concept for Jordan Valley; Arab League rejection of Johnson Plan; Egypt: background with Nasser; desire for military aid; Nasser’s turn east—Bandung, Czech arms deal; US, Nasser, and Aswan Dam)
| | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 |
| Defense budget | $13.3B | $60.4B | $44B |
| Army | 591,000 | 1.55M | 1.595M |
| Navy | 451,000 | 1.01M | 1.05M |
| Air Force | 411,000 | 1.06M | 973,000 |
Saturday, March 8, 2008
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