April 9 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

The First President Bush

April 9, 2008

I. Reagan and Southwest Asia

1. The Iran-Iraq War (from CENTCOM to pro-Saddam tilt; the Tanker War and reflagging decision; US and Gulf States)

2. Casey & Wilson (Reagan and cult of covert operations; Wilson and ability to maneuver Congress)

3. Victory and Its Effects (CIA/Saudi/ISI alliance; significance of stingers; missed opportunities?)

II. The End of the Cold War and the Revival of Middle East Tensions

1. The Cold War Ends (Gorbachev and crumbling of Soviet bloc—perestroika, glasnost; Eastern bloc strategies of survival; economics, Solidarity, and Poland; Hungary and DDR; collapse of East Germany and reunification; importance of the Baltic States and emergence of Yeltsin; dissolution of USSR)

2. The Middle East in the New World Order (Gorbachev foreign policy; PRC and Tiananmen; Saddam after the Iraq war; Bush background—political difficulties, Panama invasion; Bush and Shamir; NSD 26; Bush and the Saudis; Khomeini’s death and Iran’s turn inward)

3. Afghanistan in the New World Order (media role; Wilson and continued push for aid; ISI and Kashmir; Najibullah and desire for national unity government—Bush, Wilson, Pakistan rejection; Bush I: bureaucratic divisions, global distractions; what could US have done differently?—question of leverage)

III. The Gulf War

1. Run-up to the Invasion (Iraq and NSD 26; Congress: Dole, Simpson, and aid, Metzenbaum and human rights, Gonzales, Kerry, and BNL; Justice Department; Kuwait dispute: diplomatic failure?, trusting Saudis; US intelligence failure?)

2. Run-up to the War (Bush, Thatcher, and decision to protest; significance of Saudis; Kuwaitis and U.S. public opinion; Bush and international coalition—role of Arab states; role of UN—significance of Shevardnadze, realism and the relationship with PRC, path to UN 678)

3. Domestic Matters (domestic difficulties: Bush, taxes, and 1988 campaign; deficit, interest rate, and economic slowdown; Darman and budget deal; emergence of Gingrich; Bush and Mitchell: congressional Democrats and post-Cold War world; 1990 elections; Bush and UN argument; congressional pressure; Senate debate; Baker-Aziz meeting)

4. War & Aftermath (decision for war and operation of coalition military strategies—air campaign, effect of Vietnam; diplomatic strategies—importance of Israel, Scuds and Palestinians; media and the war—CNN, Scud Stud; invasion and Powell Doctrine; no-fly zones and Bush response; UN sanctions and WMDs)

April 2 Notes

The Reagan Agenda

April 2, 2008

I. The Carter Years
1. Carter and the Middle East Peace Process (Sadat and Begin; nature of settlement; limited political benefits)

2. The Iranian Revolution (US intelligence failure; death of regime; hostages and “rescue mission”; crisis and its effects)

3. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Brezhnev Doctrine and invasion; origins of mujahadin)

II. Documents of U.S. Foreign Policy

1. FRUS (Seward and government openness; development of 30-year rule; post-WWII bureaucratization and State Dept. Historian’s Office; pre-1961: http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/; post-1961: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/)

2. Other Sources (FDR and development of presidential library system; Watergate and presidential papers; FOIA and foreign policy; National Security Archive: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/)

3. Approaches to Field (journalists and independent scholars; diplomatic history; theory, public policy, and political science)

III. Reagan and the Middle East

1. The Reagan Team (election of 1980 and altered American political culture; growth of defense budget; importance of William Casey, Haig, Kirkpatrick; nomination of Lefever; Weinberger; increasing importance of NSC)

2. AWACS (Big Oil and Saudi alliance; altered strategic situation—Iran/Iraq war; Yemen, Ethiopia, Sadat assassination; Reagan and confronting Congress; Israel Lobby and House rejection; significance of Jepsen; final Senate vote)

IV. Iran-Contra

1. Lebanon and Iran (Reagan and international terrorism; Israeli invasion of Lebanon; US troops to Lebanon: War Powers Act and Hezbollah terrorist attack; hostages and US response; search for the Iran “moderates”; role of NSC; diversion of funds to contras)

2. The Scandal Breaks (Hasenfus and crash; from Lebanon to Washington; Meese investigation; Tower Committee; what was Reagan’s role? Bush’s; Inouye Committee and North as GOP folk hero)

Year	Defense budget	Year	Defense budget
1977	$97.2B	1979	$116.3B
1980	$134.0B	1981	$157.5B
1982	$185.3B	1983	$209.9B
1984	$227.4B	1985	$252.8B

March 31 Notes

The Carter Years

March 31, 2008

I. Transforming Middle East International Relations
1. The War (Nixon, Sadat, and realpolitik; nature of war Kissinger, Nixon, and constitutional crisis)

2. Postwar Arab Diplomacy (origins of OPEC diplomacy and transformation of Middle East—strains in European alliance)

3. The Eagleton Amendment and Its Effects (Turkish invasion of Cyprus, new internationalists, and Greek Lobby; reaction and view of erratic congressional power)

II. Human Rights Diplomacy

1. From Ford to Carter (Ford transition; attacks on Kissingerian foreign policy: Jackson and neoconservative critique of détente, Reagan and conservative critique of détente; Ford political readjustments and effect on Middle East peace process; Carter bid: Iowa & New Hampshire, anti-Washington appeal, weaknesses of major rivals; campaign and Ford revival; Carter victory; foreign policy apparatus—Vance, Brzezinski, Derian)

2. Carter and the Middle East Matters (energy policy and attempt to weaken OPEC; leadership problems and Democratic divisions; failure; Egypt-Israeli peace process: reviving Kissinger’s agenda; Sadat and realpolitik; Meir, Rabin, and collapse of Labor; Begin victory; nature of settlement; limited political benefits—Panama Canal Treaties, 1978 elections)

III. The Collapse of Carter’s Regional Policy

1. The Iranian Revolution (Carter and the Shah; Derian and foreign aid; weakening of Shah; US intelligence failure—trapped in the 1950s?; death of regime; second oil shock; from Bani-Sadr to Khomeini; hostages and American popular culture; “rescue mission” and resignation of Vance; crisis and its effects)

2. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (great game and Afghanistan’s role in regional affairs; from Zahir Shah to 1978 coup; assassination of Amin and Soviet intervention; changing international context—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan; Carter administration response—failure of intelligence analysis, doves, SALT, and wishful thinking?, role of Brzezinski and origins of covert campaign; international response—role of UN, India, 1980 Moscow Olympics; initial Soviet successes)

3. The Path to CENTCOM (strategic shift: hostage crisis, Afghan invasion, and path to “Carter Doctrine”; Carter indecision, bureaucratic rivalries within military; early 1980s decisions; importance of Diego Garcia; Cold War framework)

March 26 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Transforming Middle East International Relations

March 26, 2008

I. The Nixon Effect
1. New Regional Structure? (détente and opening to PRC; openings to Iran, Pakistan)

2. Bureaucratic Rivalries (Kissinger vs. Rogers, Nixon’s conspiracy theories)

3. New Threats (terrorism; Jordan)

II. The 1973 War and Its Effects

1. Nixon and Sadat (Egypt and creation of anti-Israel alliance—importance of Iraq and Libya, resumption of relations with Syria, squeezing Jordan; Sadat and the Soviets; Sadat and Nixon—role of realpolitik: adversaries or allies?; missed opportunity?)

2. War & Consequences (Israeli intelligence failure; legacy of preemption; Egyptian and Syrian advances; failure of mediation and US decision to airlift; Brezhnev role—testing limitations of détente?; Kissinger, Nixon, and constitutional crisis—nuclear mobilization; reversal of fortunes; path to cease-fire)

3. Postwar Arab Diplomacy (origins of OPEC diplomacy and transformation of Middle East—importance of Saudi Arabia, strains in European alliance; US decisionmaking structure and renewed questions about Nixon; Cold War framework: Zionism-as-racism resolution)

III. Crisis Points

1. The Eagleton Amendment and Its Effects (colonels’ regime, coup, and Turkish invasion; Congress—new internationalists: arms sales issue: Symington and Pakistan, Nelson-Bingham amendment, Middle East as venue; Greek lobby—importance of Sarbanes and Brademas, imitating Israeli lobby; path to Eagleton amendment; reaction—Kissinger, Turkey and US bases, congressional retreat; legacy: erratic congressional role, discrediting new internationalists?, significance of Turkey)

2. Carter and the Middle East Peace Process (Sadat and realpolitik; Meir, Rabin, and collapse of Labor; Begin victory; Carter and foreign policy—1976 campaign, odd arrangement—Vance, Brzezinski, Derian; nature of settlement; limited political benefits)

3. The Iranian Revolution (Carter and the Shah; Derian and foreign aid; weakening of Shah; US intelligence failure—trapped in the 1950s?; death of regime; second oil shock; from Bani-Sadr to Khomeini; hostages and American popular culture; “rescue mission” and resignation of Vance; crisis and its effects)

4. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Afghanistan and the great game; deposition Zahir Shah and beginning of instability; Islam and Communism; Brezhnev Doctrine and assassination of Amin; Karmal presidency and invasion; origins of mujahadin)

/BBC

March 24 Notes

U.S. and the Middle East

Middle East Realpolitik

March 24, 2008

I. LBJ and the Middle East

1. LBJ and Foreign Policy (domestic concerns; bureaucratic approach; view of Israel)

2. Background to 1967 War (U.S. arms sales; rising tensions between Israel and neighbors; growing Soviet role; LBJ and the Middle East)

3. The Conflict (Jordanian decision to intervene and balance of power; U.S. response)

II. From LBJ to Nixon

1. Aftermath of War (increased Soviet presence; land for peace and UN 242; French reversal; U.S. policy: Israel and sale of Phantoms; maintaining regional allies: oil diplomacy, significance of military aid—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran; tensions with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; European influence—Lebanon, Gulf region)

2. Nixon (Nixon background: political decline, refashioning himself as foreign policy expert, transition from anti-communist extremist to elder statesmen, Six Crises and overall approach; Nixon, Kissinger, and transforming international affairs: Vietnamization—from “peace with honor” to a “decent interval”; opening to China and triumph of realpolitik; détente and Soviet Union—path to SALT I; difficulties with Congress)

III. A Realigned Middle East

1. Realigning U.S. Middle Eastern Policy (search for new anchors—Iran: role of Shah, strategic concerns, relationship with Israel, preference for authoritarianism; Pakistan: background, Pakistan-PRC-United States triangle, Nixon and India, long-term effects)

2. Early Regional Initiatives (Kissinger/Rogers tensions and State/NSC relationship; Nixon paranoia and establishment of secret government; Rogers and Jordan; United States, Israel, and 1970 Jordanian crisis; Nixon and Israel; Nixon, Vietnam, and American Jews)

3. Terrorism (emergence of terrorism: European far left—aftermath of 1968, Red Army Fraction and West Germany, anti-semitism and European terrorism; alliance between European and Palestinian terror groups; internal Palestinian battles; Munich massacre; U.S. approach)

4. The 1973 War (Egypt and creation of anti-Israel alliance—importance of Iraq and Libya, resumption of relations with Syria, squeezing Jordan; Sadat and the Soviets; outbreak of war and Israeli intelligence failure; legacy of preemption; Egyptian and Syrian advances; failure of mediation and US decision to airlift; Brezhnev role—testing limitations of détente?; Kissinger, Nixon, and constitutional crisis—nuclear mobilization; reversal of fortunes; path to cease-fire)

March 24 Reading

Nixon documents, relating to the 1973 war:

• Memorandum of Conversation [Memcon] between Muhammad Hafez Ismail and Henry Kissinger, 20 May 1973
• Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for the President's Files, "President's Meeting with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on Saturday, June 23, 1973"
• Brezhnev to Nixon, 24 October 1973
• Nixon to Brezhnev, 25 October 1973
• Memcon, "Meeting with Oil Company Executives," 5:30 p.m., 26 October 1973
• Kissinger memorandum for the President's File, "Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin on Tuesday, October 30, 1973"
• Memcon between Meir, Nixon, and Kissinger, 1 November 1973

LBJ--New Tapes

At another point in their call, Eisenhower turned back to events of his administration, urging the President to revive the Johnston Plan. (The President seemed more interested in eating.)

But Kosygin wasn’t interested—while Eisenhower and Johnson shared a bit of triumphalism about the current situation in the Middle East (we heard the second part of this clip in class).

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Dwight Eisenhower: As I study this problem, there’s two in the Mideast—two problems—that have got to be settled before there’s ever going to be any, even a modus operandi there in the Mideast. One of them is water, and the other one is these refugees.

Now, they can be tied up, it seems to me, if we could set up a scheme of a corporation, a world corporation, something like they started out with the Suez Canal, or this atomic thing in Vienna [IAEA].

Suppose our government bought 51 percent of the stock, and then we built, in succession, three great big salt purification plants along there in the Levant, the eastern Mediterranean. And to sell the stock to bankers all around the world, and so on. Make the water problem there—I mean, a water solution—make it so attractive that both sides would be almost compelled by their people to take it. [The President chomps on his food.]

For example, I’ve been talking to some of these AEC people—scientists, scientific people—they say that without too expensive a thing, you could put 500 million, or up to a billion, gallons a day, and water much of Israel, Jordan, Egypt east of the Suez, and some of Syria, probably.

Well, now—you see, we had that old Jordan River thing [the Johnston Plan] that you could do something—

President Johnson: I broached that to him this afternoon.

Eisenhower: Did you?

President Johnson: I didn’t get any comment. I told him that our people had talked to me about it just before the meeting.

Eisenhower: Yeah.

President Johnson: He said, “Well, I just want to say this. I don’t think we can talk about anything else until you get the troops withdrawn.” He said, “We’re referees in a fight, and you’ve got to get your man by the nape of the neck, and I got to get our man by the nape of the neck, and you’ve got to separate them and put them back in their corner.” [Eisenhower chuckles.] He said, “Then we can talk about other things.”

Eisenhower: Oh, well, about their man, though—they have to pick him up and revive him. [Both laugh.] That’s the difference.

President Johnson: Well . . .

Lyndon Johnson was a President unusually sensitive to the domestic impact of his foreign policy decisions.

So it came as little surprise that the President was concerned with how Middle Eastern affairs played on the domestic front. In this clip from the Dirksen call, Johnson complained about how American Jews such as Goldberg and New York senator Jacob Javits were poor representatives for the Israeli cause.

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Everett Dirksen: They read me a long cable tonight, that covered that [Saudi King] Faisal meeting.

President Johnson: Well, I have that. We got that in our intelligence. It was very good. His people told it to us, too. And the Kuwaits [sic] have been pretty good.

Dirksen: Yeah. So they have.

President Johnson: The Arabs cannot unify behind anything ever except the Jews.

Dirksen: Well, now—

President Johnson: And if the goddamn Jews had behaved, and be quiet, and let you talk for them or let [Majority Leader Mike] Mansfield talk for them, or let somebody else—instead of Goldberg and [New York senator Jacob] Javits and all them . . .

That just sets them afire when they get up—

Dirksen: Yeah.

President Johnson: They just get afire.

Dirksen: By the way, you didn’t forget to tell [Undersecretary of State] Nick [Katzenbach] to get on Jack [unclear], did you?

President Johnson: I told Nick to come talk to you, and get your judgments on it. He’s not for the resolution.

Dirksen: No.

President Johnson: He thinks we oughtn’t to have any resolution.

Dirksen: Yeah. Well, Jack [Javits] was working like a goddamn eager beaver, you know.

President Johnson: Well, he wants to, and I can understand his concern. I’d be worried if it was Texans. But it’s not wise. That’s not the best thing,

Dirksen: Yeah.

President Johnson: Because somebody else . . . You know, it’s a man that’s a fool that is his own lawyer.

Dirksen: Yeah. But the hell of it is you can’t talk him out of it when he gets these ideas. And then he just scours that goddamn [Senate] floor.

President Johnson: Yeah.

Dirksen: Saying, “Will you join with me in this resolution?”